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II.-393 
WANT TO KNOW A SECRET . . . ? 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, NATIONAL 
SECURITY, AND THE ROLE OF THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 
Abstract: On February 29, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held in Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation (Fazaga II) that the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)—passed in 1978 to limit the govern-
ment’s ability to conduct certain surveillance activities without court authoriza-
tion—displaces the state secrets privilege in all cases involving electronic surveil-
lance for foreign intelligence purposes. Until recently, courts applied the proce-
dures set forth in FISA only to claims brought under FISA. Meanwhile, the state 
secrets privilege—a common-law doctrine insulating the government from disclos-
ing sensitive information related to national security in court—has long governed 
the U.S. government’s use of electronic surveillance for domestic and foreign intel-
ligence purposes. This Comment examines the conflict between national security 
and individual liberties underlying FISA and the state secrets privilege. It argues 
that, in times of unprecedented technological advances, Fazaga II appropriately 
preserves the role of each governing branch in protecting these values. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court first authorized the government to conduct electronic 
surveillance on its citizens in 1928.1 Since then, technological advances have 
only made surveillance easier to exploit and more difficult to detect.2 Although 
United States citizens enjoy the constitutional right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by the government, the government routinely monitors 
individuals as they travel, talk on the phone, and browse and communicate 
online.3 Though intrusive, electronic surveillance is essential to national secu-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the government’s unwar-
ranted wiretapping of private citizens does not violate the Fourth Amendment), overruled by Berger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 50–60 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 2 See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, 3, 9 (1985), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&
did=727025 [https://perma.cc/BQ6Z-BRCU] [hereinafter OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT] (stating that 
the “virtual revolution” in electronic surveillance technology that took place between 1965 and 1985 
made electronic surveillance easier to conduct and harder to adjudicate). 
 3 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (establishing citizens’ right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures without probable cause); OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 12–14 (providing a 
historical overview of the government’s use of electronic surveillance). For example, police depart-
ments and federal agencies across the country operate automatic license plate readers, surveillance 
cameras, and radiation sensors, and they monitor telephone records and track social media accounts, 
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rity; intelligence and military operations utilize these technologies to detect 
and prevent acts of terrorism and other criminal activity.4 This conflict be-
tween national security and personal liberties has long troubled the court sys-
tem.5 
The state secrets privilege—a common-law evidentiary privilege allowing 
the government to withhold otherwise discoverable material when it contains 
sensitive information regarding national security—is fundamental to the judi-
ciary’s treatment of national security cases.6 Congress also addressed the issue 
in 1978 when it passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).7 
FISA codified rules and procedures regarding the government’s use of elec-
tronic surveillance in foreign and domestic intelligence operations.8 
This Comment explores the state secrets privilege and FISA through the 
lens of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 2019 decision in Fazaga v. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (Fazaga II).9 In Fazaga II, the Ninth Circuit held that 
                                                                                                                           
among much else. Somini Sengupta, Privacy Fears Grow as Cities Increase Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 13, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/14/technology/privacy-fears-as-surveillance-
grows-in-cities.html [https://perma.cc/HDK8-6RPD]. This process of gathering as much surveillance 
information as possible about human activity is known as “data mining.” Id. 
 4 See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 2, at 11, 22 (discussing surveillance technolo-
gy’s ability to uncover valuable information in the law enforcement and national security sector and 
the need to balance individual liberty interests with the government’s interest in using electronic sur-
veillance). 
 5 See id. at 10, 12 (stating that historically Congress, the courts, and the executive branch have 
balanced society’s interest in individual liberties against its interest in national security when consid-
ering electronic surveillance policy); see, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 354 (rejecting the government’s ar-
gument that its electronic surveillance of the defendant was justified because the officers had strong 
reason to believe that the defendant was committing a federal crime); Korematsu v. United States, 323 
U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944) (holding that the government was permitted to detain and displace innocent 
Japanese individuals in order to prevent espionage and sabotage), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 
S. Ct. 2392, 2422 (2018). 
 6 See Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau Investigation (Fazaga II), 916 F.3d 1202, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(discussing the development of the state secrets privilege); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 
303–04 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining the constitutional importance of the state secrets privilege allow-
ing the executive branch to protect the secrecy of sensitive government information). As early as 
1875, the Supreme Court dismissed a claim against the government due to the potential danger of 
revealing government secrets if the case were to proceed. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 
107 (1875) (affirming dismissal of a case where litigation would result in the disclosure of confiden-
tial government information). 
 7 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1813 (2018).  
 8 Id. FISA created a procedure for courts to follow when deciding whether some instance of gov-
ernment surveillance activity was lawful. Id. § 1806(f). Though this Comment focuses solely on the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 also play a large role in governing electronic 
surveillance. See id. (providing protections for electronic communications and transactions); Electron-
ic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1986) (creating procedures for governmen-
tal authorities to gain judicial permission for wiretapping); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1968) (permitting government surveillance for criminal law enforce-
ment purposes in certain contexts and in accordance with specific procedures). 
 9 916 F.3d 1202 (2019); see infra notes 14–111 and accompanying text. 
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the judicial review procedure provided in FISA is applicable to all claims aris-
ing out of an allegedly unlawful use of electronic surveillance, thus preempting 
the state secrets privilege for matters relating to electronic surveillance.10 Part I 
of this Comment introduces the legal and factual background of Fazaga II.11 
Part II discusses how the Ninth Circuit balanced national security concerns 
with individual liberties and ultimately arrived at its decision.12 Finally, Part III 
argues that the Ninth Circuit was correct to overturn the district court’s prob-
lematic decision and emphasizes the importance of balancing administrative 
and democratic values in a technologically advanced society.13 
I. NATIONAL SECURITY, STATE SECRETS, AND FISA 
In Fazaga II, the Ninth Circuit held that the in camera and ex parte re-
view procedure set forth in FISA is applicable to all claims arising out of an 
allegedly unlawful use of electronic surveillance, therefore preempting the 
state secrets privilege.14 Section A of this Part explains the legal context under-
lying the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the development of the state secrets privi-
lege, and the enactment of FISA.15 Section B provides a factual overview of 
Fazaga II.16 Lastly, Section C recounts the case’s procedural history.17 
A. Legal Context 
In March 1953, in United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court held that 
the state secrets privilege allows the government to withhold sensitive military 
or intelligence information from discovery.18 To succeed on a state secrets 
                                                                                                                           
 10 916 F.3d at 1230. 
 11 See infra notes 14–51 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 52–85 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 86–111 and accompanying text. 
 14 See 916 F.3d at 1230–31 (holding that the FISA procedure directly addressed the national secu-
rity concerns underlying the state secrets privilege and, as a result, that Congress intended for it to 
displace the privilege). In camera refers to a judge’s private review of information. In camera, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Ex parte refers to a motion that a court considers without 
hearing from the opposing party. Motion, id. 
 15 See infra notes 18–34 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 35–41 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 42–51and accompanying text. 
 18 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953). In Reynolds, three widows of passengers killed in a military plane crash 
sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Id. at 3; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 
2674 (2018) (providing that the United States government could be found liable “in the same manner” 
that any private citizen would). When the plaintiffs sought to review the Air Force’s official accident 
record and the surviving crewmembers’ statements, the government moved to suppress, claiming that 
the information was privileged. Reynolds, 34 U.S. at 3–4. The District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs 
had shown good cause for producing the evidence and therefore waived the government’s privilege 
claim, but the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 5–6. The Court concluded that even when there is a 
demonstrated need for the information, a claim of privilege cannot be overcome if the court deter-
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privilege claim, the government must meet three requirements.19 First, after 
personally reviewing the material, the head of the relevant government de-
partment must formally assert the privilege.20 The claim must provide enough 
detail about the basis and scope of the asserted privilege for the court to deter-
mine its validity.21 Second, the court must determine if the information is, in 
fact, privileged.22 Though this determination takes the specific circumstances 
of the case into account, the court must ultimately defer to the government on 
matters of national security.23 Third, if the court sustains the claim, it will de-
termine whether the case can proceed without disclosure of the privileged in-
formation or if it requires dismissal.24 
Although the government rarely employed the state secrets privilege in 
the twenty years following Reynolds, the government’s use of unauthorized 
electronic surveillance—and the public’s concern over this practice—
expanded in the late 1970s.25 In June 1972, in United States v. U.S. District 
                                                                                                                           
mines that the case poses a risk of disclosing military secrets. See id. at 11 (explaining that although 
courts should consider the importance of the information at issue, they should ultimately defer to the 
executive branch’s assertion of privilege). “Privilege” is defined as “a special legal right, exemption, 
or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; an exception to a duty.” Privilege, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 14. 19 See Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1202 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (outlining the three steps to successfully asserting a state secrets privilege claim). 
 19 See Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007) (outlining the 
three steps to successfully asserting a state secrets privilege claim). 
 20 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–8. 
 21 Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1228. 
 22 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8. 
 23 See id. at 9, 10 (explaining that although a court must first determine that disclosing the infor-
mation would present a risk to national security if it is to allow the government to assert the privilege, it 
should not insist on examining the evidence if the government has presented sufficient information to 
show that disclosure could present a danger to national security); Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203 (stating 
that the judiciary must “defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security”). 
 24 See Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1204 (explaining that if information is withheld under the state 
secrets doctrine, litigation can proceed only if the plaintiffs can prove the facts necessary to their 
claim without that information); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
the privileged information was so essential to the plaintiff’s claim that the entire action required dis-
missal). Reynolds distinguished between the evidentiary privilege against disclosing sensitive infor-
mation—the “Reynolds privilege”—and those cases in which the underlying subject matter concerns 
state secrets and thus requires the complete dismissal of all claims: the “Totten bar.” Reynolds, 345 
U.S. at 6–7; see also Totten, 92 U.S. at 107. 
 25 See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1233 (reviewing FISA’s legislative history); Robert M. Chesney, 
State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1291–92 
(2007) (tracing the evolution of the state secrets privilege). In 1976, a congressional task force re-
vealed that the government had long been conducting unauthorized surveillance and using its findings 
improperly for years. See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1233 (citing SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY 
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, BOOK II: INTELLI-
GENCE ACTIVITIES & THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94–755, at 290 (1976)). The commit-
tee recommended legislation to deter unlawful surveillance and to prevent further abuses of executive 
authority. Id. These findings, however, especially in combination with the Watergate scandal and 
surrounding media attention, caused public trust in the government to fall dramatically. Chesney, 
supra at 1264.  
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Court (Keith), however, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
required judicial approval of any electronic surveillance of American citizens, 
thus limiting the executive’s use of the practice.26 Consequently, litigation over 
the use of electronic surveillance grew, and the government began asserting the 
privilege more regularly.27 
At the suggestion of the Senate Judiciary Committee and Justice Powell 
in his majority opinion in Keith, Congress intervened by enacting FISA in 
1978.28 FISA created rules and procedures for the use of electronic surveil-
lance and established a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to approve 
government applications for electronic surveillance warrants.29 Procedurally, 
FISA gives courts the ability to review in camera and ex parte—privately and 
without input from the opposing party—any material necessary to determine 
whether the government lawfully collected the electronic surveillance infor-
mation over which it asserts a privilege.30 
                                                                                                                           
 26 407 U.S. 297, 313–14, 317–18 (1972). The case is commonly referred to as Keith, the name of 
the district judge respondent. DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTI-
GATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS § 31:3 (updated Sept. 2019).The Supreme Court had previously estab-
lished in 1967 in Katz v. United States that the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures was not limited to physical trespass, but also prevented the government from 
conducting wiretaps without a warrant. 389 U.S. at 359. In Keith, the Court concluded that the gov-
ernment was not excused from this requirement just because the surveillance fell within the broad 
classification of domestic security. 407 U.S. at 320.  
 27 See Chesney, supra note 25, at 1292 (discussing the increased use of the state secrets privilege). 
Although courts decided only six cases concerning the state secrets privilege in the nineteen years 
after Reynolds, they decided sixty-five in the next twenty-nine years. Id. at 1297. 
 28 See Keith, 407 U.S. at 323–24 (noting that judicial approval is necessary for domestic security 
surveillance and that the sensitive nature of the issue may warrant the creation of a special court by 
Congress); ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40888, PRESI-
DENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER FOR-
EIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 12–13 (2006) (discussing the history of FISA). See generally 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1801–1813 (creating a new process for courts to follow when dealing with the govern-
ment’s use of electronic surveillance). 
 29 See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a)–(g) (limiting the government’s ability to disclose information obtained 
through electronic surveillance); Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1232 (providing an overview of FISA’s struc-
ture and specifications). If the government seeks to disclose such information obtained through elec-
tronic surveillance, it must follow minimization procedures requiring it to notify plaintiffs of any 
electronic surveillance information that it intends to enter into evidence. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(a)–(g). 
FISA also provides that persons against whom the government brings electronic surveillance evidence 
may move to suppress that evidence if it was not acquired in accordance with FISA. Id. 
 30 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f). FISA specifies three situations in which a court is to follow its review 
procedure: when the government gives notice of its intent to disclose information obtained through 
electronic surveillance, when a party subjected to unauthorized electronic surveillance moves to sup-
press information obtained through the surveillance, and when a person subjected to unauthorized 
electronic surveillance requests to view information relating to its content or usage. Id. § 1806(c)–(f). 
In 1991 in ACLU Foundation of Southern California v. Barr, the D.C. Circuit held that when a court 
reviews material under FISA, it must determine whether the surveillance was lawfully conducted 
under both FISA and the Constitution. 952 F.2d 457, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In the same year, the First 
Circuit came to the same conclusion in United States v. Johnson. See 952 F.2d 565, 571–73 (1st Cir. 
1991) (using FISA’s review procedure to examine the constitutionality of electronic surveillance). 
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Plaintiffs trigger FISA review when they invoke the statute to allege an 
unlawful use of electronic surveillance.31 When they challenge electronic sur-
veillance on grounds other than FISA, however, the state secrets privilege gen-
erally enables the executive branch to withhold information about its activity 
simply by asserting that the surveillance concerns national intelligence.32 In-
deed, the privilege has been widely criticized for allowing the executive 
branch to easily avoid judicial review.33 In Fazaga II, the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed these concerns by holding that the judicial review process outlined in 
FISA applies even in non-FISA claims.34 
B. Factual Background 
In 2006, the FBI hired Craig Monteilh to work as a confidential informant 
on a counterterrorism probe called Operation Flex.35 Two FBI agents, Kevin 
Armstrong and Paul Allen, supervised Monteilh and instructed him to gather 
information about the Muslim community in Southern California by obtaining 
Muslim individuals’ contact information, befriending them, and placing elec-
tronic surveillance equipment in specific locations.36 Monteilh surveilled the 
                                                                                                                           
Unauthorized electronic surveillance is lawful under FISA only when it is unlikely to include commu-
nications between United States citizens. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2008).  
 31 See John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801 et seq.) Authorizing Electronic Surveillance of 
Foreign Powers and Their Agents, 190 A.L.R. FED. 385, § 4 (2003) (providing examples of cases 
involving the scope of FISA and the ex parte review of electronic surveillance evidence). 
 32 See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1226 (stating that no other federal court of appeals had addressed 
the question of whether FISA displaces the state secrets privilege in non-FISA electronic surveillance 
claims, such as violations of the Fourth Amendment or the Privacy Act); see, e.g., Abilt v. CIA, 848 
F.3d 305, 317–18 (4th Cir. 2017) (dismissing the case under the state secrets privilege); United States 
v. Schulte, 1:17-CR-00548, 2019 WL 4688707, *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding that the state secrets 
privilege protected the relevant information and ordering the government to provide redacted summar-
ies of the documents). The United States District Court for the Central District of California in Fazaga 
v. Federal Bureau of Investigation (Fazaga I) held in 2012 that causes of action arising from statutory 
or constitutional provisions other than FISA are not within FISA’s scope and, therefore, are vulnera-
ble to dismissal under the state secrets privilege. See 884 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1037–38 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 
 33 See Carrie Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through Govern-
ment Misuse, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99, 119 (2007) (arguing that the state secrets privilege is 
being used to dismiss cases prematurely, thereby interfering with private and public constitutional 
rights); Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless Wiretapping, Fisa Reform, and the Lessons of Public Liberty: 
A Comment on Holmes’s Jorde Lecture, 97 CAL. L. REV. 407, 429, 432 (2009) (arguing that govern-
ment transparency and institutional integrity are essential to protecting public liberty); Christina E. 
Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 625, 630 (2010) (arguing 
that the state secrets privilege does not provide the judicial branch with sufficient power to hold the 
executive branch accountable for misuse of authority). 
 34 Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1230; see infra notes 52–85 and accompanying text. 
 35 Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1212. 
 36 Id. During his time working for Operation Flex, Monteilh helped the FBI obtain “hundreds of 
phone numbers; thousands of email addresses; background information on hundreds of individuals; 
hundreds of hours of recordings of the interiors of mosques, homes, businesses, and associations; and 
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community for over a year, attending daily religious services at the Islamic 
Center of Irvine (ICOI), as well as prayers, classes, lectures, fundraisers, and 
other events with members of the Muslim community with whom he had made 
contact.37 Monteilh recorded nearly all these interactions, including conversa-
tions he had with Sheikh Yassir Fazaga, an imam at a local mosque, and Yasser 
AbdelRahim, an ICOI congregant.38 
Once Monteilh assimilated into the Muslim community, Armstrong and 
Allen instructed him to inquire about jihad and armed conflict and to express 
interest in taking violent action.39 In response, ICOI community members re-
ported Monteilh to community leaders who called the FBI and the Irvine Po-
lice Department.40 The ICOI then requested a restraining order against Mon-
teilh and, eventually, his identity as an FBI informant was revealed.41 
C. Procedural History 
In September, 2011, Fazaga, AbdelRahim, and Ali Uddin Malik, another 
practicing Muslim at the ICOI, filed a class action in the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California on behalf of all Muslim individuals 
who Monteilh surveilled during Operation Flex.42 The complaint accused the 
government and, separately, the federal agents in their official capacities, of 
unlawful discrimination and searches, asserting violations of FISA, the First 
Amendment’s Religion Clauses, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
                                                                                                                           
thousands of hours of audio recordings of conversations, public discussion groups, classes, and lec-
tures.” Id. He recorded his interactions with a cellphone, two key chains capable of recording audio, 
and a camera attached to a button on his shirt. Id. at 1213. FBI officials later transcribed the record-
ings. Id. 
 37 Id. at 1212–13. While attending community events, Monteilh collected the names of leaders in 
the community, license plate numbers from cars in the mosque parking lot, individuals’ travel plans 
and charitable activities, and other information that could be used to recruit additional informants for 
the FBI. Id. at 1213. 
 38 Id. at 1213, 1218. 
 39 Id. at 1213–14. Monteilh told several individuals that he could acquire weapons and was will-
ing to engage in violence in the name of his faith. Id. at 1214. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. A court granted the ICOI a restraining order against Monteilh in June of 2007. Id. A few 
months later, the FBI discharged Monteilh from Operation Flex and told him not to speak about the 
investigation. Id. Monteilh’s identity as an informant was not revealed until 2009, when one of the 
ICOI members who he had been in contact with, Ahmadullah Niazi, was prosecuted for naturalization 
fraud. Id. At Niazi’s bail hearing, another FBI agent testified that he had heard recordings of Niazi 
speaking with an FBI informant, the same man who the ICOI had reported to the police. Id. Various 
sources confirmed that Monteilh was the informant in question and that he had been working for the 
FBI at the time. Id. The FBI, though it revealed some information about Monteilh’s role in the opera-
tion, insisted that the operation was a matter of national security and thus that the details of Monteilh’s 
activities must be kept secret. Id.  
 42 Id. At the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fazaga II, the plaintiffs had not yet been certi-
fied as a class, partly due to the unresolved nature of the government’s assertion of the state secrets 
doctrine. Id. 
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the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Federal Tort Claims 
Act (FTCA).43 
In response, both the government and the agents moved to dismiss the 
claims.44 The government also moved for summary judgment.45 It argued that 
the plaintiffs’ claims under the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, the Privacy Act, FISA, the Religious Freedom Act, and 
the Federal Tort Claims Act should be dismissed under the Reynolds state se-
crets privilege because they could not be litigated without risking the disclo-
sure of privileged information.46 
Although the district court permitted the FISA claim against the agents to 
proceed, it dismissed all other claims against both the agents and the govern-
ment.47 Specifically, the court dismissed the FISA claim against the govern-
ment, as well as the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and RFRA claims 
against the agents, due to sovereign immunity.48 The court dismissed the re-
maining claims, including the Fourth Amendment claim, due to the Reynolds 
state secrets privilege.49 The court thus rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
FISA preempted the invocation of the privilege over these claims, holding that 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the government and its agents violated the First and Fifth 
Amendments of the Constitution by surveilling them because of their religion. Id. at 1242. Additional-
ly, the plaintiffs maintained that the defendants violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) by infringing upon their freedom of religion. Id. at 1246. The FTCA claim contended that the 
government infringed upon the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under California law, including their 
right to privacy, and also asserted intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 1250. The Privacy 
Act claim alleged that the FBI had unlawfully collected and maintained information regarding the 
plaintiffs’ religious practices. Id. at 1248. 
 44 Id. at 1215. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id.; see Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 6–7 (explaining that the privilege against revealing military se-
crets is well established). The government did not assert the state secrets privilege over the Fourth 
Amendment claims. Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1215. 
 47 Fazaga I, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. 
 48 Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1215. Sovereign immunity is defined as “a government’s immunity 
from being sued in its own courts without its consent.” Sovereign immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY, supra note 14. The district court found that Congress had not waived sovereign immunity for 
damages claims under FISA and therefore dismissed the FISA claim against the government. Id. The 
plaintiffs did not challenge this finding on appeal. Id. Regarding the religion claims, the plaintiffs 
showed that the defendants’ conduct caused them to become less inviting to new mosque attendees, to 
attend mosque less frequently, to donate less to mosque institutions, and, for Fazaga in particular, to 
abandon his counselling practice for mosque attendees. Id. at 1247. Nonetheless, the court held that, at 
the time of the surveillance, there was insufficient case law to put the defendants on notice that their 
conduct could contravene the RFRA. Id. 
 49 Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1215. The District Court concluded that the disclosure of any infor-
mation related to Operation Flex, irrespective of whether the information was privileged, would pre-
sent too great a risk to national security to justify moving forward with the case. Fazaga I, 884 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1029. It reasoned that the government could not defend itself against the plaintiffs’ claims 
without relying on privileged information. Id. 
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FISA procedures apply to FISA claims only.50 Both the plaintiffs and the agent 
defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit.51 
II. FAZAGA II: DISPLACING THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE  
IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE CASES 
In February 2019, in Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation (Fazaga 
II), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the district court’s dismissal 
of the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims.52 The Ninth Circuit held that the 
in camera and ex parte review procedure outlined in the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) applied to all claims arising out of an allegedly un-
lawful use of electronic surveillance, precluding the assertion of the state se-
crets privilege.53 Section A of this Part explains the court’s reasoning in 
Fazaga II.54 Section B discusses the policy concerns underlying the district 
court and Ninth Circuit decisions.55 
A. The Ninth Circuit Clarifies the Proper Role of FISA 
Until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Fazaga II, no federal court of ap-
peals had addressed whether the procedures outlined in FISA supersede the 
state secrets privilege.56 Two district courts, however, previously held that be-
cause the state secrets privilege developed as a common-law rule of evidence 
in the absence of relevant legislation, FISA displaces the privilege on matters 
addressed in the statute.57 The Ninth Circuit expanded upon these decisions, 
explaining that FISA’s language and legislative history demonstrate that its 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Fazaga I, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1038. 
 51 Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1216. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims. Id. The 
agents appealed the denial of qualified immunity on the FISA claim. Id. The Fazaga II court ad-
dressed both appeals. Id. 
 52 916 F.3d 1202,1225 (9th Cir. 2019) (agreeing with the plaintiffs’ contention that the District 
Court should have utilized the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’s procedure in reviewing the 
purportedly privileged information).  
 53 See id. at 1238 (concluding that “the plain language, statutory structure, and legislative history” 
of FISA revealed Congress’s intent “to displace the state secrets privilege and its dismissal remedy 
with respect to electronic surveillance.”). 
 54 See infra notes 56–73 and accompanying text. 
 55 See infra notes 74–85 and accompanying text. 
 56 See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1226 (stating that the Ninth Circuit was the first federal court of 
appeals to address the issue). 
 57 See Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1105–06 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that 
FISA was intended to supersede the state secrets privilege in FISA-related issues); accord In re Nat’l 
Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that 
FISA displaces the state secrets privilege when the issue is “within FISA’s purview”). It is well estab-
lished that when Congress enacts legislation that speaks directly to an issue addressed in common law, 
the common law is displaced. Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1230 (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 
529, 534 (1993)). 
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procedural provisions should not be limited to FISA claims.58 Rather, they 
should apply to all claims related to unauthorized electronic surveillance.59 
First, the Ninth Circuit looked to FISA’s language.60 According to the 
statute, its procedure for judicial review should apply whenever the govern-
ment moves to suppress electronic surveillance information requested by the 
opposing party on the grounds that releasing the information would create a 
national security risk.61 This procedure governs regardless of the court in 
which the motion is brought, and regardless of any other law.62 Thus, accord-
ing to the Ninth Circuit, the statute necessarily displaces the usual procedures 
governing the admission of evidence and the dismissal remedy utilized by the 
state secrets privilege.63 Moreover, the FISA review procedure is triggered by 
circumstances almost indistinguishable from those that precipitate an exercise 
of the state secrets privilege.64 For example, if the Attorney General asserts 
that disclosure of the surveillance information would endanger national securi-
ty, the reviewing court should follow FISA.65 These same circumstances, how-
ever, could also trigger a motion to dismiss under the state secret’s privilege.66 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1231–32, 1238. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1231. 
 61 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (2018). FISA states: 
Whenever any motion or request is made by an aggrieved person . . . to discover or ob-
tain applications or orders or other materials relating to electronic surveillance or to dis-
cover, obtain, or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from electronic 
surveillance under this chapter, the [court] . . . shall, notwithstanding any other law, if 
the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hear-
ing would harm the national security of the United States, review in camera and ex 
parte the application, order, and such other materials relating to the surveillance as may 
be necessary to determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawful-
ly authorized and conducted. 
Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1231–32 (holding that the text of FISA directly addresses the ques-
tion previously answered by the common-law state secrets privilege). The government argued that 
absent a clear statement from Congress, principles of constitutional avoidance—the notion that courts 
should avoid interpreting statutes in a way that raises difficult constitutional issues—required the 
court to uphold the state secrets privilege. Id. at 1230; see Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional 
Questions Versus Avoiding Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV. L. REV. 331, 331 (2015) (defining consti-
tutional avoidance). The court clarified that although the privilege has “constitutional overtones,” it is 
a common-law evidentiary rule. Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1230. 
 64 Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1232. 
 65 See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f); Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1232 (concluding that the nearly identical 
circumstances under which FISA and the state secrets privilege apply demonstrate the legislative 
intent to displace the use of the privilege in the context of electronic surveillance). 
 66 See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f); Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1232. Similar to the review procedure in FISA, 
the state secrets privilege is applicable whenever the head of the relevant governmental department 
asserts a formal claim of privilege in the name of national security. See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1232 
(comparing the concerns underlying the state secrets privilege with those underlying FISA). 
2020] Electronic Surveillance, National Security, and FISA II.-403 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted this overlap as a signal from Congress that courts 
should utilize FISA procedures in circumstances that would otherwise trigger 
the state secrets privilege.67 
Second, looking to the rest of the statute and its legislative history, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that Congress intended to create a comprehensive 
process for courts to evaluate government assertions of privilege over electron-
ic surveillance for national security purposes.68 The Ninth Circuit thus found 
no reason to restrict FISA’s applicability to FISA claims.69 For one, the statute 
was passed in the wake of a condemnatory Senate investigation into the execu-
tive branch’s unauthorized surveillance activities.70 The investigation exposed 
the executive branch’s unlawful surveillance practices and concluded that the 
judiciary had failed to create a legal framework capable of protecting the con-
stitutional rights of citizens.71 Moreover, Congress has referred to FISA proce-
dures, in combination with provisions of the Wire Tap Act and the Stored 
Communications Act, as the only lawful means of conducting electronic sur-
veillance.72 According to the Ninth Circuit, the language of, and legislative 
intent behind, the statute evidenced an attempt to create additional checks on 
executive power.73 
                                                                                                                           
 67 See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1232 (explaining that FISA replaces the state secrets privilege be-
cause FISA requires in camera and ex parte review in the same circumstances that, were it not for 
FISA, would call for dismissal of the case under the state secrets privilege). 
 68 See id. at 1234 (explaining that in the aftermath of the Senate investigation, Congress aimed to 
balance the often-times conflicting goals of national security and protecting individual rights against 
surveillance). The Ninth Circuit also pointed out the absurdity of allowing a court to review in camera 
and ex parte materials relating to a FISA claim, but not allowing the court to consider the same mate-
rial as evidence in the same plaintiffs’ non-FISA claims. Id. at 1238. 
 69 See id. at 1236–37 (explaining that the language and purpose of FISA do not support the argu-
ment that the statute is applicable in only limited circumstances). 
 70 Id. at 1233. The committee in charge of this investigation, the Senate Select Committee to 
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, was formed in 1975. Id. It is 
commonly referred to as the Church Committee. Id. 
 71 See id. at 1233–34 (describing the findings and recommendations of the Church Committee 
following its investigation into the executive branch’s surveillance tactics). The Church Committee 
attributed the executive branch’s abuse of power to a failure to maintain the checks and balances de-
signed by the Framers. Id. (quoting SENATE SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS 
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, BOOK II: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES & THE RIGHTS OF 
AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94–755, at 290 (1976)). It explained that because the law on electronic sur-
veillance for national security purposes had developed entirely through case law, the doctrine was 
based on a small, unrepresentative sample of cases and failed to examine electronic surveillance intel-
ligence holistically. Id. (quoting H. REP. NO. 95–183, pt. 1, at 21 (1978)). 
 72 Id. at 1232–34 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2018) and S. REP. No. 95–604, pt. 1, at 7 
(1978)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1978) (establishing the Wiretap Act); 18 U.S.C. § 2701–2712 
(1985) (establishing the Stored Communications Act). Both the Wiretap Act and the Stored Commu-
nications Act concern the disclosure of electronic communication information. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 
2701. 
 73 See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1234 (concluding that FISA aimed to create a fairer balance be-
tween national security and individual liberty concerns). 
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B. Protecting National Security and Personal Liberties 
Although the government did not assert the state secrets privilege over the 
plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment or FISA claims, the district court dismissed the 
claims on state secrets grounds.74 It reasoned that further litigation of the case 
would risk exposing information inextricably intertwined with privileged ma-
terial, such as FBI sources, names of individuals under investigation, and 
counterterrorism strategies.75 
In reversing the district court’s judgement, the Ninth Circuit pointed out 
that the head of the relevant government department must formally claim the 
state secrets privilege and describe in detail why it is necessary.76 The Ninth 
Circuit also reasoned that the district court’s sweeping dismissal of the plain-
tiffs’ claims contradicted the well-established principle that the state secrets 
privilege should be granted as infrequently as possible due to its severe cur-
tailment of due process rights.77 
The need to balance national security and individual rights—and the fail-
ure of the district court to do so—was essential to the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion.78 But the importance of invoking the state secrets privilege only when 
necessary has been argued before; it was fundamental to the assertion of privi-
lege in Reynolds and courts have discussed it extensively in other state secrets 
cases, including the district court in Fazaga I.79 For example, in determining 
whether to uphold the state secrets privilege, courts have consistently held that 
all of the evidence and circumstances of a case must be examined, including 
the importance of the information to the plaintiffs’ claim and the nature of that 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau Investigation (Fazaga I), 884 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1045 (S.D. Cal. 
2012) (concluding that the circumstances warranted terminating the case entirely rather than removing 
the specific evidence at issue). 
 75 Id. at 1029. 
 76 Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1228. 
 77 Id.; Fazaga I, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. United States v. Reynolds and subsequent cases discuss 
the importance of employing the state secrets privilege in limited circumstances. See 345 U.S. 1, 8 
(1953) (explaining that too much investigation into a privilege claim would bring the very information 
that allegedly required protection to light, whereas too little investigation would result in unnecessary 
abuses of the privilege); Fazaga I, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1041–42 (explaining that the decision as to 
whether to apply the state secrets privilege is ultimately left up to the courts, not the government de-
partment asserting it); see, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d 1070, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2010) (dis-
cussing the need to defer to the executive branch on issues of foreign policy and to promote a fair 
adversarial process); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 304–05 (4th Cir. 2007) (discussing the 
difficulty of balancing the role of the courts with that of the executive branch in the context of evaluat-
ing evidence); Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 335 F. Supp. 3d 772, 787 (D. Md. 2019) ap-
peal docketed, No. 20-1191 (4th Cir. Feb. 18, 2020) (discussing courts’ duty to defer to the executive 
branch without impetuously accepting claims of privilege). 
 78 See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1227–28 (discussing the importance of only invoking the state se-
crets privilege when necessary so as to protect meritorious claims from dismissal). 
 79 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases in which courts have 
emphasized the importance of using the state secrets privilege sparingly). 
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claim.80 Likewise, courts agree that judicial deference to the executive on mat-
ters of foreign intelligence does not prevent a court from reviewing privileged 
information if it is not otherwise clear that the privilege claim is necessary.81 
At the same time, the Ninth Circuit’s decision recognized that in matters 
of national security, some degree of government secrecy—and thus some re-
striction on individual rights—is permissible.82 The Ninth Circuit explained 
that although courts should not dismiss plaintiffs’ claims outright on state se-
crets grounds, the nature of the information at stake may still prevent plaintiffs 
from realizing their normal due process rights.83 Thus, FISA does not prevent 
the government from withholding discoverable information by revoking the 
state secrets privilege.84 On the contrary, it codifies the privilege and sets forth 
a specific procedure for its application.85 
III. CAREFUL BUT MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that conducting electronic surveil-
lance against United States citizens without judicial approval is an unreasona-
ble exercise of executive power, regardless of the circumstances.86 Still, most 
recent presidents have justified the use of electronic surveillance by asserting 
their power and responsibility to protect national security.87 In the absence of 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10–11 (noting the relevance of the fact that the claim pertained to 
national defense efforts, specifically air power, and that the plaintiffs could likely litigate their claims 
without the information at issue); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining 
that a court should review claims of privilege in light of the case’s particular circumstances). 
 81 See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10 (noting that a court must be satisfied that the materials at issue 
present a reasonable danger of exposing secret information related to national security if the court is to 
employ the state secrets privilege); El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305 (explaining that a court may conduct an 
in camera review of the allegedly privileged information if doing so is necessary to conclude that the 
Reynolds standard is met); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that there will 
be instances in which a court reviews allegedly privileged information in camera). 
 82 See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1226 (stating that the FISA procedure will restrict the rights normal-
ly afforded to plaintiffs in court and that the state secrets privilege developed as a way to protect es-
sential national security interests). 
 83 Id. 
 84 See id. at 1231–32 (explaining the plain meaning of FISA’s language and the significance of its 
applicability in circumstances that would otherwise call for application of the state secrets privilege). 
 85 See id. at 1232 (explaining that FISA reflects Congress’s intent to formalize a procedure by 
which courts review electronic surveillance material when it relates to national security, thus codify-
ing the state secrets privilege for matters related to FISA). 
 86 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) (explaining that alt-
hough the President’s contentions about the importance of certain information to the nation’s security 
could not be dismissed lightly, the executive branch nevertheless must abide by Fourth Amendment 
standards). 
 87 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (requiring that the President take an oath to protect and defend the 
Constitution); Keith, 407 U.S. at 310 (discussing the use of electronic surveillance for constitutional 
purposes by presidents throughout history); Nathan Alexander Sales, Article, Secrecy and National 
Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L. REV. 811, 839 (2007) (noting that various presidents have author-
ized illegal wiretaps in the name of national security). 
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adequate judicial or legislative oversight, this power has been abused.88 Before 
the Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in United States v. U.S. District Court 
(Keith), for example, the executive branch monitored thousands of innocent 
citizens for unusually long periods of time and used covert surveillance to 
track civil rights activists, pro-Communist groups, and other persons of politi-
cal interest—all without a warrant.89 And, before the enactment of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the government secretly collected and 
used information about citizens’ political activities, associations, and personal 
lives.90 In his concurring opinion in Keith, Justice Douglas stated that these 
practices are an unsurprising consequence of unbridled executive discretion.91 
The majority agreed, declaring that legislative guidance and judicial review of 
government decisions are essential to protecting individual freedoms such as 
privacy.92 
The Southern District of California’s approach in 2012 in Fazaga v. Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (Fazaga I) exemplifies the Keith Court’s con-
cerns.93 The district court erred in dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims on 
state secrets grounds, despite the government only asserting the privilege over 
the religion claims.94 Likewise, the court improperly disregarded the review 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Keith, 407 U.S. at 325–26 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing the executive branch’s 
abuse of its ability to conduct warrantless surveillance and providing examples of government activity 
leading up to the Keith decision); Sales, supra note 87, at 839 (discussing the executive branch’s sur-
veillance activity in the 1960s and 1970s). 
 89 See Keith, 407 U.S. at 325–26 (Douglas, J., concurring) (explaining the defendants’ surveil-
lance activity and providing examples of instances in which their tactics appeared extreme); Sales, 
supra note 87, at 839 (providing examples of the kinds of surveillance the executive branch conducted 
without judicial oversight). See generally 50 U.S.C. § 1801–1813 (2018). For example, the FBI infa-
mously surveilled Martin Luther King Jr. during this period and later used the information to black-
mail him. Sales, supra note 87, at 839. King was first investigated in 1955 after organizing a 385-day 
bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama. Ryan Sit, Here’s What the FBI Had on Martin Luther King Jr., 
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/fbi-martin-luther-king-jr-surveillence-
wiretap-report-j-edgar-hoover-780630 [https://perma.cc/E8KC-4QAE]. By 1965 the Bureau had 
tapped King’s phone calls and bugged his house, office, and hotel rooms. Id. 
 90 Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau Investigation (Fazaga II), 916 F.3d 1202, 1233 (2019) (quoting SENATE 
SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI-
TIES, BOOK II: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES & THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, S. REP. NO. 94–755, at 290 
(1976)). 
 91 See Keith, 407 U.S. at 326–27 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that the government’s willing-
ness to invade individuals’ privacy in the name of security is the very reason that the Constitution 
requires the executive branch to obtain a warrant before conducting domestic surveillance). 
 92 See id. at 316–18 (explaining that because individual rights are protected by a separation of 
powers among the three branches, the executive branch should not judge its own decisions). 
 93 See infra notes 94–96 and accompanying text (explaining the district court’s decisions in 
Fazaga I and their potential consequences had they been upheld). 
 94 Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1228; see Fazaga v. Fed. Bureau Investigation (Fazaga I), 884 F. Supp. 
2d 1022, 1042, 1045 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that the information collected throughout Operation 
Flex would pose a great public safety risk if disclosed and thus that all claims dependent on this evi-
dence be dismissed). 
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procedure that Congress designed for cases like Fazaga I.95 Consequently, if 
the district court had its way, the executive branch would be able to conduct 
certain electronic surveillance activities without having to follow the legisla-
ture’s plan or being subject to the court’s review.96 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit in Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (Fazaga II) concluded that Congress and the judiciary may check the ex-
ecutive’s use of electronic surveillance without compromising the essential 
role of executive power in matters of national security.97 First, FISA allows the 
government to conduct electronic surveillance so long as it has some measura-
ble relation to foreign intelligence.98 When determining whether such a rela-
tion exists, courts should defer to the relevant national security official.99 This 
standard, which would apply with or without FISA’s displacement of the state 
secrets privilege, preserves the executive branch’s authority over the use of 
electronic surveillance.100 Second, when parties request electronic surveillance 
information related to national security, FISA’s review procedure prevents 
courts from disclosing any purportedly privileged information unless it is es-
                                                                                                                           
 95 Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1230; see Fazaga I, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 (finding no reason to sup-
port “an expansive application of FISA”). 
 96 See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1228, 1234 (discussing the district court’s dismissal of all the plain-
tiffs’ claims and concluding that FISA represents an effort to review the surveillance activities of the 
executive branch). See generally Fazaga I, 884 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. 
 97 See Fazaga II, 916 F.3d at 1232 (explaining that although the FISA procedure modifies the 
review process under the state secrets privilege, FISA is also concerned with threats to national securi-
ty). 
 98 See 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a) (providing that the government is authorized to use electronic surveil-
lance so long as foreign intelligence is a significant purpose of the surveillance); In re Sealed Case, 
310 F.3d 717, 735–36 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding that the significant purpose standard 
is met so long as the government realistically shows that it is dealing with foreign intelligence rather 
than criminal prosecution); Dvorske, supra note 31, § 3b (explaining the circumstances under which a 
judge should issue an order for the use of electronic surveillance). The significant purpose standard is 
lower than the standard that traditionally must be met to obtain a warrant, which requires a showing 
that the investigation is the primary purpose of the surveillance. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 
F.3d 102, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that if it has probable cause, the government is able to obtain a 
warrant for any good-faith pursuit); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that electronic surveillance may be allowed on less than the traditional probable cause stand-
ard because of the Fourth Amendment protections built into FISA). Previously, FISA required the 
government to show that the primary purpose of the surveillance was foreign intelligence. Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1805 (amended 2001). Congress amended this 
provision following the September 11th attacks through the Patriot Act, which generally expanded the 
power of the executive branch to conduct surveillance for the purpose of preventing terrorist attacks. 
See Dvorske, supra note 31, at 385 (discussing the amendment of FISA through the USA PATRIOT 
Act and the Fourth Amendment probable cause concerns that the amendment brought about).  
 99 See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 736 (stating that the national security official in charge of 
the matter is meant to judge the government’s purpose in using electronic surveillance, rather than the 
FISA court). 
 100 See id. (noting that the Attorney General has full authority to decide whether to authorize an 
investigation). 
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sential to determining the legality of the surveillance.101 As of October 2019, no 
court of appeals has made such a disclosure.102 The difference between the pro-
cedures provided in FISA and the dismissal remedy under the state secrets privi-
lege is, therefore, minimal— FISA calls upon judges to review, in camera and ex 
parte, the material at issue, whereas the state secrets privilege permits courts to 
exercise this review only when absolutely necessary.103 Thus, neither procedure 
allows for the disclosure of privileged information to the plaintiffs.104 FISA 
merely prevents the executive branch from escaping review altogether.105 
As the capacity for covert electronic surveillance expands, the executive 
branch continues to face scrutiny for its broad use of electronic surveillance 
domestically and abroad.106 Without a system of formal review in place, the 
ease with which the executive branch may employ unwarranted surveillance 
technology and infringe on individuals’ privacy will continue to grow.107 Alt-
hough the use of electronic surveillance remains essential to the executive 
branch for national security purposes, technologies such as facial recognition, 
computer hacking, and internet surveillance present new, unsanctioned ways to 
intrude on individual privacy.108 
                                                                                                                           
 101 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f). 
 102 See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 26, § 31:3 (reviewing the history of the FISA review proce-
dure and the outcomes of FISA litigation). In Keith, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that 
receiving judicial approval prior to conducting any electronic surveillance would threaten the secrecy 
necessary for a successful intelligence operation. 407 U.S. at 320–21. The Court noted that judges 
have historically dealt carefully with confidential information and could be relied upon to respect the 
secrecy required by law. Id. 
 103 See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (outlining FISA’s review procedure); United States v. Reynolds, 345 
U.S. 1, 8 (1953) (noting that a court must find that the materials at issue present a reasonable danger 
of exposing secret information related to national security if it is to employ the state secrets privilege). 
 104 See KRIS & WILSON, supra note 26, § 31:3 (describing the legislative history of FISA and 
analyzing the importance of various FISA cases). 
 105 See 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (providing a review procedure by which the judiciary can ensure the 
validity of the government’s claim). 
 106 See Mark D. Young, Electronic Surveillance in an Era of Modern Technology and Evolving 
Threats to National Security, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 11–12 (2011) (discussing the rise of the 
internet, electronic mail, data sharing, and other technology, all of which provide access to personal 
information); Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers 
Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order [https://perma.cc/NGV2-DW7P], (reporting that the National Security 
Administration had been collecting the telephone records of millions of Americans); Sheila A. Millar, 
Electronic Surveillance and Monitoring, KELLER & HECKMAN LLP (Nov. 01, 2004), https://www.
khlaw.com/1225 [https://perma.cc/ZC76-RPL4] (discussing the increase in U.S. surveillance activities 
after September 11th and finding that governments across the world have generally expanded the use 
of surveillance tactics over time). 
 107 See Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and 
Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 295, 298 (1999) (discussing the increasing ability of law enforce-
ment to conduct electronic surveillance); Sengupta, supra note 3 (reporting large increases in the City 
of Oakland’s spending on the collection of surveillance data and technological equipment). 
 108 See Adam R. Pearlman & Erick S. Lee, National Security, Narcissism, Voyeurism, and Kyllo: 
How Intelligence Programs and Social Norms Are Affecting the Fourth Amendment, 2 TEX. A&M L. 
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In order to prevent national security interests from smothering individu-
als’ right to be free from arbitrary privacy invasions, Congress must regulate 
the implementation of this new technology, and the judiciary must have the 
power to review executive compliance.109 By holding that FISA preempts the 
state secrets privilege, the Ninth Circuit ventured to protect the role of all three 
branches in complex decisions about the expanding use of electronic surveil-
lance.110 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit kept both national security and individ-
ual liberty in mind.111 
CONCLUSION 
Courts struggle to balance protecting individual liberty with legitimate na-
tional security concerns. But the district court in Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation did no balancing; it prioritized the government’s potential national 
security interests over all of the plaintiffs’ potentially meritorious claims. Recog-
nizing this failure, the Ninth Circuit replaced the state secrets privileges with the 
procedures Congress enacted in the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act. By 
preserving in camera and ex parte review of information retrieved through elec-
tronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, the Ninth Circuit appropri-
ately balanced deference to the executive branch against the preservation of pri-
vate citizens’ individual liberties. Fazaga II did not uproot notions of executive 
primacy over the other branches when dealing with issues of national security. 
Instead, it reinforced a system that prioritizes the executive’s judgment while 
maintaining checks and balances against abuse of its power. 
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Preferred citation: Jesslin Wooliver, Comment, Want to Know a Secret . . .? Electronic Surveillance, 
National Security, and the Role of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 61 B.C. L. REV. E. 
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